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ABSTRACT

This chapter presents an analysis of pricing (and taxation) of
agricultural and industrial goods in U>Cs.

We identify and explain the

central tradeoffs involved in changing prices, in reforming prices, and in
setting optimal prices.

Our analysis is based on a aeneral equilibrium

model of a dual (agricultural-in dustrial) economy in which there is a
multitude of goods and income groups in each sector.
of results on price reforms and optimal pricing.

Ye present a number

For instance, we show how

Pareto improving price reforms (which do not hurt anyone in the society,
and make the society better off) can be conducted for cash crops and
production inputs, based on extremely limited information.

Our analysis

also leads us to argue that there is a case against taxing some cash crops
or agricultural inputs, while subsidizing others, no matter what the
society's aversion to inequality is.
Our framework 6f analysis is not only consistent with a variety of
alternative institutional features of LDCs, but it also shows that these
features have a marked influence on what the prices should be.

An

understanding of these influences is important because there is enormous
diversity among LDCs in their institutional structures, and in the set of
policy instruments they can use.

For the same reason, some of the basic

prescriptions of the standard tax theory (which is based on special
assumptions reflecting the structure of developed economies) turn out to be
misleading in the context of LDCs.

We also discuss in this chapter some of

the issues of political economy from which the standard tax theory has
abstracted but which, we believe, may be central in the analysis of
taxation and pricing policies.

i

THE TAXATIO~ A..~D PRICING OF AGRIC[LTURAL AND I~DUSTRIAL GOODS
IK DEVELOPING ECONOMIES*
1.

INTRODUCTION

In most less developed countries (LDCs), governments play an active
role in setting the food prices received by farmers and the food prices paid
by city dwellers.

They do this through a variety of mechanisms, such as

agricultural marketing boards, which often have a monopoly on the purchase of
certain goods from farmers and their sale to. consumers; price regulation
authorities, which control the prices at which private traders can sell;
explicit food subsidies, sometimes accompanied by rationing; and by export
and import taxes and subsidies.!

Their objectives in attempting to alter the

prices which would emerge in the absence of government intervention are
several.

o

In this chapter, we focus on the following of their objectives:

to increase the income of peasants who are often among the poorest
in the economy

o

to subsidize the poorer city dwellers.

In most LDCs direct income

subsidies are not feasible, and food subsidies may be an effective
way of helping the poor.
o

to tax the agricultural sector to capture resources for investment
and for public goods creation.2

o

to attain some level of self-sufficiency in specific goods, and
avoid excessive dependence on the international market.3

o

to counteract the effects of rigidities in the economy, such as
price and wage rigidities in domestic markets and the country's
lack of access to a free international trade and borrowing
environment.4

* Prepared for the forthcoming volume, The Theory of Taxation for Developing
Countries, edited by D.O.G.Newbery and N.H. Stern.
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In some cases, the stated objectives seem at variance with the policies
adopted.

Though the government may claim that food subsidies are meant to

help the urban poor, it may not subsidize the grain consumed by the poor
(millet. for example), but rather the grain consumed by those relatively
better-off (rice, for example).

In other cases. the government may fail to

achieve its objectives due to corruption and incompetence .

Though the

intended objective of a marketing board may be to help producers and
consumers, in some cases it may actually

•

harm both groups by running

excessively costly operations.
In other cases. the stated objectives appear inconsistent or confused.
The government attempts to subsidize everyone. to increase the prices received
by farmers and to lower the prices paid by city dwellers, without articulating
who is paying for the subsidies, and indeed, without a clear view of the full
incidence of the complicated set of taxes and subsidies which are levied.
This confusion is further compounded when many different agencies set prices
of different goods.

Often these aiencies act independentl y of one another,

under contradictor y assumptions about society's objectives and the constraints
facing the economy.5
Different agricultural pricing policies have markedly different effects
on the welfare of farmers versus city dwellers. on government revenue. on
investment, and on the distribution of income within each sector. 6

A study.of

these effects requires a general equilibrium analysis in which the dependence
of demands and supplies on pricing policy is modelled, and in which the
overall constraints facing the economy (such as the balance of trade
constraint and the government revenue constraint) are also taken explicitly
into account.7
us not only

We develop such a model in this chapter.

This model enables
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to identify those circumstance s in which changes in the pricing policy can
make all of the groups in the society better-off, but also to characterize the
qualitative aspects of the optimal pricing policy.
This chapter is a part of a research program we have undertaken which
examines the reform and the design of taxation and pricing policies in U>Cs,
using models which reflect not only the institutiona l features of developing
economies, but aho the limitations on the policy instruments available to U>C
governments . 8

Our re~~arch makes use of two important strands of economic

literature:

modern development economics, and the recent advances in public

economics.

We follow much of the modern development economics literature in

modelling an LDC as a dual economy, in which the forms of economic
organization in the agricultural (rural) and industrial (urban) sectors may
differ markedly.

Among the more specific features of U>Cs which we take into

account are (i) the presence of widespread urban unemploymen t, which may be
caused by (ii) urban wages which are set above market clearing levels,
9
inducing (iii) migration from the rural to the urban sector.

Thus, while a

central concern of the standard tax theory, which has been developed in the
context of economies with full employment, is the effect of tax policy on
individuals ' labor supply,lO a more relevant concern in the context of LDCs
may be the effect of these policies on unemploymen t and migration.
The development experience of the past quarter century has also made it
abundantly clear that there is no single 'model' of an U>C.

While in some

countries sharecroppin g may predominate , in others family farmers may be more
typical.

While landless peasants may constitute a large fraction of the

agricultura l population in some countries, they may not in others.

One of the
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objectives of our research program has been to ascertain which features of the
economy are critical in determining the consequences of changes in prices and
taxes.

In fact, one of our contributions is the development of formulae which

hold for a variety of institutional arrangements. 11

Of course. the values of

the parameters within these formulae may differ from one institutional setting
to another.
In analyzing the consequences of alternative institutional features, it
is also important to understand the economic forces which may have aiven rise
to them. 12

This is particularly important in the case of high urban wages.

Governments may be well aware that the urban unemployment is induced by high
urban wages;

and it may be of little use to tell them once again that

their first order of business should be the reduction of urban wages, and to
predicate all other taxation and pricing policies on the assumption that they
will do so.

And it may be no less realistic to assume that while direct wage

cuts are not feasible, indirect wage cuts through increased prices are.
Moreover, wage reductions (direct or indirect) may not always be desirable if
they lead to a significant decrease in productivity through, for instance,
their effects on workers' health, incentives, and turnover. 13
Our work employs many of the techniques of modern public finance theory
·to understand the consequences of ·ta.ution and pricing policies in U>Cs.

We

agree with Harberger (1962) that to understand these consequences, one needs
to construct simple general equilibrium models.

Thus, like Harberger, we

construct a two-sector economy but, unlike him, each of our two sectors
contains many different income groups.

Moreover, our interpretation of the

two sectors as well as our assumptions, for example, those concerning wage
flexibility, factor mobility, and price determination differ from those of
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Barberger.

We also follow the literature on taxation in exploiting the close

similarity between proble~s of pricing and taxation, and in balancing out
concerns for equity and efficiency by making explicit use of social welfare
functions. 14
The main differences between a meaningful approach towards the problems
of pricing and taxation in LDCs and the approach that has typically been
followed in the standard tax literature concern the salient features of the
economy (some of which.we have indicated above) and the limitations on the
instruments available to the government.

We believe that a critical part of

the reality of most LDCs is that their governmenucan employ an extremely
limited set of instruments and, as we shall see below, these constraints have
important consequences on the analysis of pricing and taxation policies. 15
An important example of the constraints on policy instruments in \he

context of LDCs is as follows.

If the government can set different prices in

the two sectors for the goods traded between the sectors (we assume in this
chapter that it can) then a change in the prices in one sector has no direct
effect on individuals in another .sector.

If. on the other hand, the

government cannot do so for some goods (because, for instance, it is too
expensive or difficult to monitor the movement of these goods between the two
sectors), or does not wish to do so, then changes in the prices of these goods
have simultaneous direct effects on the individuals in both sectors.

This

alters the nature of desirable price reforms as well as the characteristics of
optimal prices (see our 1984a and 1985a papers for the corresponding
analysis).
A practical problem in the i~plementation of desirable pricing policies
in LDCs is that reliable estimates of many of the critical parameters of the
economy are not easily available . 16

One would, therefore, like to know what

kinds of statements one can make oL the basis of qualitative information.
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Similarly, there is no reason that there should be unanimity, or even
consensus, about what social weights to attach to different groups.

Thus, one

would like to be able to ascertain how differences in welfare judgments would
affect one's views concerning the desirability of different policies. 17

We

have, therefore, derived a number of qualitative results (for example,
identifying situations when some commodity might be taxed and another
commodity might be subsidized) which make use only of qualitative information,
both concerning the parameters representing the structure of the economy and
the welfare weights.
In fact, given the well known obstacles to reaching a consensus on the
social weights to be associated with different groups of individuals, it is
important to analyze the properties of Pareto efficient tax structures; thes.e
properties are desirible regardless of one's views concerning the social
welfare function. 18

We have devoted considerable attention to such analyses,

and report here many rules for price and tax reforms which lead to Pareto
improvements; that is, no one is hurt by these reforms, and the society is
strictly better off.

Our rules of reform have the additional virtue that they

can be implemented with very little information.
We base our analysis on models of the economy which are quite general

(of course, these are not the most general models one can construct). 19

For

instance, our model of migration and unemployment can be specialized to the
common hypotheses such as no migration, free migration with no unemployment,
and the Harris-Todaro hypothesis in which the expected utility of the marginal
migrant is same in the two sectors; it can also be specialized to other
specifications, such as the one in which an individual's utility in one sector
is some (ixed fraction of that in the other sector (see the chapter by Heady
and Mitra in this vclume).

Oi:r model for the determination of agricultural
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wages and earnings is consistent with a wide variety of competitive as well as
noncompetitive rural labor markets. 2

° Further,

in our general model, we do

not impose any restriction on the number of goods in the economy, or on the

nature of intrasectoral and intersectoral inequality. 21
We believe that one of the main uses of the kind of formal analysis we
present here is to contribute to a more informed policy debate; to identify,
for instance, those instances in which there is an important equity-efficienc y
trade-off from those in which there is not, or to help see the full
ramifications of any policy decision, ramifications which become apparent only
within a general equilibrium model in whi.ch careful attention is paid to the
institutional structure of the economy.
this chapter to discuss simulation
and prices.

It is not, however, the purpose of

procedures for calculating optimal taxes

Rather, our research provides the conceptual background which is

necessary for the empirical attempts to investigate the consequences of
taxation and pricing policies.
Outline of the Chapter:

This chapter is divided into ten sections.

Though it would clearly be possible to begin our analysis by presenting the
most general model, and then specializing the model to obtain more specific
results, a better understanding of what is at issue is obtained by beginning
our analysis (in Sections 2 and 3) with a simple model, in which there is a
single commodity produced in each sector.

Our concern in these sections is to

identify the central tradeoffs in the analysis of pricing and taxation.
Section 4 then analyzes the disaggregated structure of taxes within the
agricultural sector, while Section 5 analyzes the same within the industrial
sector.
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Our objective in this chapter is not to present the general
formulations which we have analyzed elsewhere, but rather to provide an
exposition which brings out as clearly as possible some of the central issues,
including the role of alternative institutional structures.

In section 6,

therefore, we use a simple model to examine the consequences of migration and
unemployment on pricing policy.

In Section 7. we discuss several other

variations of our model, including alternative agricultural organizations and
international trade en;-ironment.

Further, because there are differences

(concerning the salient features of the economy, the feasibility of various
policy instruments, and the emphasis of analysis) between our models and those
examined in the standard tax literature, we devote Section 8 to explain some
of the critical differences.
We follow a long standing tradition of abstracting from
economic considerations in our analysis,

political

Yet such considerations may, in

fact, be more important than the concerns which we discuss in the body of this
chapter.

In Section 9, therefore, we articulate some of our misgivings with

the general approach of this chapter, as well as that of modern public
economics.

Concluding remarks are presented at the end of the chapter.

2.

THE BASIC MODEL

Consider an economy in which there are two co1DJDodities and two sectors:
food and related products, produced in the agricultural sector (sector a) and
a generalized industrial good, which can be used either for consumption or for
investment, produced in the manufacturing or industrial sector (sector m).
Both goods are freely traded; the international price of the agricultural
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good in terms of the industrial good is denoted by P.
Agricultural Sector:

Agricultural sector consists of homogeneous

peasants who decide on how much labor to supply, jiven the prices at which
they can sell their surplus.
good) by p.

We denote this price (in terms of the industrial

Clearly, the level of utility which peasants can attain is a

function of this price. and we write the utility level of a representative
peasant as va(p). 22

Some of the agricultural output is consumed within the

agricultural sector a~d the surplus quantity, Q per peasant, is sold to the
industrial sector or abroad.
the peasants receive.

This quantity is a function of the price which

We denote the price elasticity of the surplus by

alnQ_
alnp

(1)

Economic theory puts no constraints on the sign of 110p (there may be a
backward bending supply schedule of the surplus); we focus attention on the
case where an increase in the price increases the marketed surplus.
11Qp

> 0.

Our formulae can be reinterpreted for the case in which 11Qp

That is,

< 0.

We assume that the government bas very few policy instruments to
control peasants' behavior; it can not directly control their output nor
their consumption,

This, we believe, is the correct representation in most

LDCs, since much of the farming in these economies is done on numerous small
plots, and the ability of the government to monitor and control the actions of
peasants seems sufficiently limited that only indirect incentives are
administratively feasible. 23

We also assume that complex pricing schemes
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are infeasible.

For example, non-linear pricing schemes in which the unit

price paid to a peasant depends on the amount he sells typically lead to
underground (unaccounted) transactions.

Accordingly, we restrict ourselves to

schemes which pay a common price to all peasants regardless of the quantities
they transact. 24
Industrial Sector:

In contrast to the agricultural sector, we assume

that there are many policy instruments in the industrial sector.

In fact, we

make the polar assumption that the government has sufficient instruments so

that the distinction between direct and indirect control can be virtually
ignored.

In many LDCs, the government is not only the largest industrial

producer and employer, but it also taxes private producers' profits, and can
sometimes control their prices and quantities. 25
For simplicity, we ignore at present the intra-sectoral income
distribution and assume that the number of hours for which an industrial
worker works is fixed .. The government takes the wage, w, it pays workers as
given, but it can control the price, q, at which .its marketing board sells
food in the industrial sector.
worker as Vm(q, w).

Thus, we write the welfare of an industrial

An industrial worker takes his income wand the price q

as given and decides how much food to consume.
as xm(q, w).

(2)

This quantity is represented

The price elasticity of the urban consumption of food is

Tixq =

a1nxm
alnq

which is a positive number, since consumption goods are assumed to be normal.
Investment:

The revenue available to the government for investment is
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the difference betv.·een the industrial output and the industrial wage payment,
plus the net revenue of the marketing board:

(3)

where Na is the number of peasants, Nm is the number of industrial workers and
Y is the output per industrial worker •

..
3.

A SIMPLE ANALYSIS OF AGRICULTURAL M1> INDUSTRIAL PRICING

Price Reforms for Pareto Improvements:
model:

There are three groups in our

the peasants, the industrial workers, and the goverDJDent which

represents future generations through its control of investment.

For each

value of p and q, we can calculate the feasible combinations of Va, Vm, and I
(see Figure 1).

We first show that certain price changes can make all groups

in a society better-off.

Insert Figure 1 Here

The utility possibilities schedule gives the maximum value of revenue
for investment consistent with any level of utility of peasants and industrial
workers.

If the existing prices are at inefficient points such as Z, then a

change in prices can make every group in the society better-off.

Figurt- l
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In the above model, an increase in the rural food price makes the
peasants better-off, but it does not affect the industrial workers.
dl
investment increases with an increase in p if GP>

o.

Also,

This happens,

from (3), if

(4)

p

< P/(1

+ 1/~Qp)

c

P·

Thus. if the price of food in the agricultural sector is less than p, then
an increase is unequivocally desirable, since it will increase the government
revenue and will also improve the welfare of peasants, without affecting the
welfare of industrial workers.
Similarly. a decrease in the urban food price makes the industrial
workers better-off, and it does not affect the peasants.
government revenue if~<

(5)

q

> P/(1

o,

it increases

or, from (3), if

- 1/~xq) = q, and ~xq

Thus, if the urban food price is above

q,

> 1.

then a decrease is unequivocally

desirable for the society. 26
These rules of price reform have many virtues. First. they identify a
lower limit for the rural food price and an upper limit for the urban food
price.

Second, the questions of reform in the rural and the urban prices can

be addressed independently of one another. 27
requires very little information.

Third, the use of these rules

Apart from the world price,

only the demand and supply elasticities are needed.

The rules do not require

social weights, which are needed to implement optimal prices, as we shall see
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later.

Moreover, the elasticities which are needed to use these rules of

reforms (as well as other rules of reform which we derive later) are those
associated with the current equilibrium, which can be calculated from the
local properties of the demand and supply functions.

This should be

contrasted with the optimal pricing rules, to be discussed below, in which the
elasticities are to be evaluated at the social optimum.
to know the

To do this, one needs

global properties of the demand and supply functions.

In addition, these rules hold in models much more general than the one

•
considered above.

(6)

The only conditions required are that

ava
ap > 0,

respectively.

and

a,,m
aq < 0,

Interpret, for instance, Va and vm as representing the aggregate

welfare of the entire group of peasants and industrial workers, respectively.
Then (6) implies that the aggregate welfare of peasants increases if the price
of their output is increased, and that the welfare of industrial workers
decreases if the food price they face is increased.

So long as these

conditions are satisfied, the above rules of price reform continue to hold.
For instance, the rule for reform in the urban food price holds
regardless of the distribution of income among industrial workers.

Similarly,

the rule for reform in the rural food price may hold no matter how agricultural
land is distributed among peasants, provided peasants are not net buyers of
food. 28

Moreover, as we shall see later, these rules of reform can be extended

in a straightforwa_rd manner when prices and wages affect individuals'
productivity, and when there is migration between the two sectors.

14

The main point we wish to establish in this section, however, is not
that the specific rules of price refo"rm proposed above are valid in every
circumstance (of course, they are not if the economy is very different), but
that one can often determine a set of rules to identify those price reforms
which improve the welfare of all groups in the society.
Optimal Prices:

The approach discussed above weeds out inefficient

pricing policies, but it does not distinguish between numerous pricing policies
whi'ch are efficient.

A choice _among these policies necessarily entails
.'f

•

trade-offs between the interests of peasants, industrial workers, and future
generations.

In th.is section, we show how to analyze these trade-offs.

First,

we expr~si the aggregate social welfare as

in which 6 is the social value of marginal investment, W(V} is the social
welfare defined over an individual's utility level, and Bis the value of
social welfare as a function of the welfare of peasants and industrial workers,
and the level of investment.29

Conceptually, this allows us to draw social

indifference curves, that is, those combinations of Va, VIII, and I among which
the society is indifferent (see Figure 1).
Differentiation of (7) with respect top and q, and a rearrangement of
the resulting expressions yields 30

dH

(8)

dp

( 9)

dq ~ 0, if q

dH

~

0, if p

5 Pµ

a

,

5 Pµm,

where
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(10)

~a

1

µa= 1/(1 + (1 - 0 ) _ ),
T\Qp

( 11)

Ai is the (positive) private marginal utility of income to a worker in
sector i, and ~i = AioW/avi is the social (weight) marginal utility of
· income to a worker in sector i.
Expression (8) implies that the social welfare is increased by
increasing (decreasing) the rural food price if the current price is lower
(higher) than Pµa.
given by (9).

A similar rule for changing the urban food price is

These rules are sharper than those we obtained earlier. This

should not be surprising, since the rules (8) and (9) require more
·information.Specifica lly, they need the social weights (at the current
equilibrium) associated with the rural and the urban incomes relative to
the social weight associated with investment.
The optimal prices are those at which the possibilities of reform
have been fully exhausted.

(12)

The optimum, thus, is represented by

p = Pµ 8

Diagrammatically, the optimum represents that point on the utility
possibilities surface (see Figure 1) which is tangent to the social
indifference curve.
We have thus obtained optimal pricing formulae, of a remarkably
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simple form, in terms of the welfare weights and the price elasticities.
The optimal price in the agricultural sector depends only on the social
weight on the income of peasants (relative to investment) and on the price
elasticity of agricultural surplus.

Similarly, the optimal price in the

industrial sector depends only on the social weight on the income of
industrial workers and the price elasticity of their demand for
agricultural goods.
The above resulJ.s have some natural interpretations.

In the early

stages of development, the social weight on investment might be thought to
exceed those on private incomes, that is, 6

> ~i.

Under such

circumstances, peasants should receive less than the international price of
food and city dwellers should pay more than the international price of
food.

That is, both sectors should be taxed. 31

Also, a higher elasticity

of agricultural surplus corresponds to a higher price paid to peasants,
because the marginal increase in the revenue from a price increase is
higher; and a higher demand elasticity of food in the industrial sector
corresponds to a lower price charged to city dwellers, because the marginal
increase in the revenue from a price increase is lower.

Further, the

smaller the social weight on peasants' income, the lower the price in the
·agricultural sector; the smaller the social weight on city dwellers'
income, the higher the price paid by them,
Implicit Tax Rates:

The optimal pricing formulae derived above can

also be stated in terms of commodity taxes.

Lett= (P - p)/p.

Then tis

the tax rate on the output of peasants; it can also be interpreted as the
rate of subsidy on their consUII1ption.

Denote the food output and the

consumption of a peasant by X and xa respectively.

Then the marketed
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surplus per peasant is

(14)

Further, define Tlxp = olnX/olnp, and 1'1xp = -olnxa/alnp as the price
elasticities of food output and consumption of a peasant.32
surplus ela_sticity can be expressed as 1'10p

=

(1

Then the

+ a)T1Xp + a 11 xp,

where a

=

xa/Q is the ratio of peasants' consumption to their marketed surplus.
Using these definitions, the optimal tax rate is obtained from (12) as

pa
( 15)

t = (1 - _ )
0

pa

1

= (1 - - )
0

+ a11

( 1 + a) 11

Xp

1

xp

The above expression for the tax rate has some similarities with those
in the traditional tax literature, but there are also some differences.
According to (15), the magnitude of the tax rate is inversely proportional to
the price elasticities of output and consumption.

This dependence is similar

to the one which was suggested in some of the earliest writings on taxation,
for example, those by Ramsey (1927) and by Pigou. 33

However, there is a basic

difference between the present policy problem, and the standard taxation
problem in which production and consumption decisions are made separately by
corporations and consumers. In the latter case, the relative roles played by
output and consumption elasticities depend very much on the government's
taxation of profits; the output elasticity does not appear in the tax
formula, for example, if the profits are entirely taxed away [see Stiglitz and
Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 467)].
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In the present problem, it is nearly impossible for the government to
distinguish between producers and consumers within the agricultural sector,
since peasants are simultaneously producers as well as consumers.
elasticity is therefore that of marketed surplus.

The key

Even though this elasticity

can be restated in terms of output and consumption elasticities, as in (15), it
is the combined effect that utters.3 4
Many Income Groups in Agricultural and Industrial Sectors:

The formulae

derived earlier can be used even when the distribution of income in the
agricultural sector is explicitly taken into account. We only need to
reinterpret ~a as the 'average' social weight corresponding to the agricultural
sector.

To see this, consider an agricultural sector in which there is a

continuum of land ownership ranging from large landlords to landless workers.
Denote an individual by the superscript h, whose land holding is Ah, whose
marketed surplus is Qh (which can be negative) and whose net labor supply
(labor hours supplied minus labor hours used on his farm) is Lh.
landless workers.

Ah= O for

The rural wage per hour, wa, is determined in the rural

labor market, and so it depends on the price of agricultural goods, p.
define~ wp

=

Further, let

We

olnwa/olnp as the elasticity of rural wage with respect top.
Q

denote the average marketed surplus, that is

Q=

l Qh/Na.
h

Then it is easily verified that (12) still characterizes the optimal
pricing rule, with the modification that now

(16)

19

where ~ih is the social weight on the income of individual h in sector i.
It is obvious from (16) that ~a is a weighted average social weight on rural
incomes. 35
AI! important property of the average social weight derived above is

that it takes into account the general equilibrium effects of prices on
incomes. 36

Also, our pricing formula. (12) and (16}, is largely independent

of the precise nature of the labor market (for example, on whether the labor
market is competitive or not).

...

The relevant parameter is the elasticity of

rural wage with respect to price, which would take specific values depending
on the features of the rural labor market.

We further discuss the

organization of the agricultural sector in a later section.
The same approach applies to the industrial sector.

With wage (income)

differences among city dwellers. (13) is the optimal pricing formula, with a
modification that

(17)

~m =

l ~mh xmh/l xmh
h

h

where xmh is the food consumption of the city dweller h.

Once again, it is

obvious from ·(17) that ~mis a weighted average of the social weights on the
incomes of city dwellers. 37
It is perhaps important to explain here the difference between applying
the rules for optimal prices based on the assumption of homogenous individuals
within a sector (such as (12)) versus the rules in which the intrasectoral
heterogeneity of individuals is explicit (such as (12) in conjunction with
(16), and those to be discussed later).

In both cases the required

information on sectoral price elasticities are the same since the government's
budget, (3), is the same.

The application of rules based on heterogenous
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individuals requires additional information on the quantities (of goods and
net labor supply) and the social weights corresponding to different groups of
If the society cares about the intrasectoral distribution of

individuals.

welfare then. clearly. the government should use the coefficients ~a and ~m

from (16) and (17) in its calculations. 38

4.

THE STRUCTURE OF PR1CES IN AGR1CULTURAL SECTOR

A major issue facing many LDCs is whether fertilizer and cash crops
should be subs·idized. to increase the production, or taxed. as a way of
raising revenues to finance government services and investment.

Sometimes it

is argued that cash crops are grown more by the wealthier peasants. and such
crops provide a particularly desirable basis for taxation by a government
concerned with redistribution.
On

the face of it, government policies in this area often seem

contradictory.

While the government provides a subsidy on fertilizer,

allegedly to encourage production, it taxes the output, which discourages
production.

Would it not be better to eliminate the subsidy, and reduce the

tax; in short, reduce the extent of government intervention in this market?
The model we have developed in the preceding section may easily be extended to
give us insights into these issues.
A General Formulation:

The range of goods produced in the agricultural

sector can be divided into several distinct categories.

Among them are those

goods which are consumed by peasants and also sold to outsiders (like food
grains), those which are produced solely for sale (cash crops like rubber and
fibers), and those which are inputs to agricultural production itself (like
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manure).

Similarly, the agricultural sector buys some goods from outside for

consumption (like te·xtiles and radios) and other goods for their use as inputs
in production (like fertilizers, pesticides and tractors). 39
All of these goods can be incorporated within our earlier model.
one needs to do is to interpret

fi'.-

What

as a vector, of which an element Qh
i

represents the net supply of the ith good from the household h to the rest of
the economy.

~
1

is positive if the peasant is a net seller of this good, and

it is negative if he is a net buyer of this good.
"\:

h

h

1

a
good i is denoted by Qi= L Q,/N.

The per capita surplus of

For those goods which are produced and

utilized solely within the agricultural sector,

Q.

1

is zero.

Ye assume that the

government can influence the prices of only those goods which cro.ss the border
between the two sectors, and that there are no taxes on trades within the
agricultural sector. 40

Naturally, p, _p and tare now vectors. 41

The effects

of a change in the price of good ion an individual's utility and on the
investment are respectively given by

(18)

ah

= A

h

(Q

i

(19)

+

d a
w

Lh)
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Where dQ includes the induced effect due to a change in the rural wage.
dpi
d,..a
~
That is, dQ = aQ
a p. + awa dp .• We can i111J11edia~ely calculate
dp.
1

1

1

the effect of a change in prices on the social welfare.

Expressions (7), (18)

and (19) yield

(20)

BB

>.

0 if

api (

..
(21)

(22)

p)

(P -

a

~i

=

dQ
dpi

2h

> (1
<

ah
~

-

~i
r

+

a
waLh
Qi
/N
1'1,rp.)
p-1

h
(Q.

1

)

Qi, where

and Tl wpi = alnwa/alnp.1 is the elasticity of rural wage with respect to the
price of good i. We thus obtain a straightforward modification of our earlier
analysis. Note that the above expressions take into account the fact that
different commodities will have different distributional effects depending on
the marketed surplus of the commodity for the rich versus the poor.

They also

emphasize that we need to take into account not only the direct effects (e.g.,
large surplus suppliers are hurt more by a reduction in the prices they
receive) but also indirect
1'1,rp.'

effects due to price-induced changes in wages,

which would be different for changes in the prices of different goods.

A

1

tax on a crop which is largely a cash crop may have deleterious distribution
effects if it depresses the labor demand and agricultural wages significantly,
because the small landholders and the landless, who are net suppliers of labor,
may well be hurt more than the large landholders.

The above expressions
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differ from our earlier analysis in a second way:

when there are other taxes

in place, a change in the tax on one commodity may change demands for other
commodities, incre.asing or decreasing tax revenues.

These effects are

incorporated in the left hand side (21).
Following our earlier analysis, it is obvious that the optimal prices
are characterized by (21) in which the inequality is replaced by an equality. 42
The implementation of this optimum, however, requires more information than
might be available.

It requires estimates of the values of all the

elasticities and of social weights at an equilibrium which may be far removed
from the current situation.

The use of (20) and (21) for reform analysis too

may be inhibited, since we seldom have good estimates of all the own- and
cross-elasticities, or of the general equilibrium responses of agricultural
wages to changes in prices of particular goods.

What we show now is that it is

possible to reform prices of certain goods based on much more limited
information.
Pareto improving price reforms which require very little information:
Pareto improving price reforms can be made for 'production goods' (that is,
those agricultural inputs and outputs which are not used for consumption, such
as fertilizers, machine inputs, cash crops, etc.) solely on the basis of the
elasticities of inputs and outputs (on unit land) with respect to the prices of
production goods.

We do not need any information whatsoever concerning

consumption responses, distribution of land, or the social weights.

The only

limitation of this price reform analysis is that the induced wage effect should
be negligible.

Even this limitation disappears under certain circumstances, as

we will see below.
Denote the net output vector of the hth household by Xh, such that the
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outputs are represented as positive quantities and the inputs are represented
as negative quantities.

For the analysis in the remaining part of this

section, we assume that there are constant returns to scale in agricultural
43
production when all inputs, including land, are taken into account.
= Ahz, where z is the net output vector per unit of land.

Thus, Xh

If the consumption

vector of the household his denoted by xah, then Qb = Ahz - xah denotes the
surplus vector of household h. 44

Now consider a change in the prices of those

goods which are employed in the rural production (as inputs and outputs) but
are not consumed.

If ith good is a production good, then fi;1 = Ahzi,

Also,

since the prices of production goods affect the consumption quantities only
h/aMh,where Mh denotes
through the full income, it follows that axah/ap.=Ahz.axa
1
1
the full income of the household h, and aMh/ap.1 = Ahz.1 is the change in full
income due to a change in Pi.

Now, if the induced

effect is negligible,

wage

then (19) can be written as

dl = [c. - 1 - BJ NaAz.

(23)

where A=

1

1

2Ah/Na

is the per capita land, tj = (Pj - pj)/pj denotes the

h

rate of tax or subsidy, &iJ'

=

represents the price elasticities
alnz./alnp.
J
1

of the production goods per unit of land, ci =

l tjeij

is the

j

proportional change (due to taxation) in the quantity of the ith production
good per unit of land, and B =

(P - p)

(2 Ah axah]/NaA.

aMh
h
symmetry property of
standard
the
used
also
have
we
In deriving (23),
inputs and outputs that azj/api = azi/apj.

Expression (23) provides the
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basis for the fol~owing rules of price reform.
Calculate Ci's for all of the production goods.

If ci) ck, and i

and k are both outputs {inputs), then increase {decrease) the price of the
ith good by a small amount, say Api' and decrease (increase) the price of
the kth good by (zi/zk)Api.

On the other hand, if the ith good is an

output (input) and the kth good is an input (output), then increase
(decrease) the price of the ith good and· increase {decrease) the price of
the kth good in the same proportion as above.

This procedure should be
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continued until all of the c.1 's are as close to one another as possible.
The above rules of reform have the property that they increase the
government revenue while leaving unchanged the utility level of every
individual.

The reforms therefore lead to strict Pareto improvement s.
If Api is the change (positive or

This can be verified as follows.

negative) in the price of the ith good, then -(zi/zk)Api is the change in
the price of the kth good.

From (18), then. vah remains unchanged since

Ahzi for production goods.

From (23), on the other hand,

(24)

Recalling that zi is positive for an output and negative for an input, it
follows from {24} that our rules of reform increase investment.
obvious from {24} that

a

It is also

necessary condition for the optimality of taxes is

that e's should be equal for all production goods.
The above rules of reform are highly parsimonious in their use of
information, as should be obvious.

The required information consists
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solely of the current taxes on inputs and outputs, current quantitie s of
inputs and outputs on unit land, and the response of these quantitie s to
the changes in the prices of productio n goods.

Also, the above reform

analysis applies to those cases in which different aroups of producers (in

different regions, for example), face different sets of prices.
In fact, our rules of reform can be applied even when the induced
wage effects are significan t.

For instance, if the production goods have

the same (but not nece~sari ly c~nstant) elasticity with respect to the
wage 45 then not only do our rules of reform hold, but also one does not
need to know anything whatsoeve r concerning the labor supply behavior of
46
household s to be able to use them.

Surely, we do not expect the above

restrictio n on elasticiti es to hold in every circumstan ce, but the relevant
empirical question is how different ere the actual induced wage effects
from those predicted by the technology with the above restrictio n?

If the

differenc e is not significan t, then our rules of reform can be employed
with extreme parsimony in informatio n.

Should some cash crops or productio n goods be taxed and others
subsidized ?

To obtain insights on this question, recall that

a

necessary

condition for the optimality of taxes is that

(25)

should be the same for all productio n goods.

That is, the proportio nate

change due to taxation in the quantitie s of production goods per unit of
land should be equal for all such goods.
Now assume, for a moment, that changes in the prices of productio n
goods have negligible cross price effects on the quantities of inputs and
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outputs (that is, Eij = O if i / j) then, from (25), tieii is the same
for all i.

>0

Next, fro~ the standard properties of production functions,

for an output and eii

<0

for an input.

£ .•
11

Also, from our definition of

ti, a positive (negative) ti implies a tax (subsidy) on an output and a
subsidy (tax) on an input.

It follows then that either all of the

production goods (inputs as well as outputs) should be taxed or they should
all be subsidized.

Also, the taxes (or subsidies) on these goods should be

proportional to their own price elasticities .
These results are important not because we believe that the cross
price effects are negligible, or that the induced wage effects are always
of the type considered above.

They are important because we have isolated

the reasons why the sign of taxes might differ among different production·
goods.

Specifically , we often find that a fertilizer is being subsidized,

while a pesticide is being taxed, or vice-versa.
subsidized while another cash crop is being taxed.

Or, that cotton is being
It is obvious from our

analysis that the justificatio n for such taxation aust lie in the presence
of large cross price effects or in the presence of specific induced wage
effects.

If it is found from empirical analysis that such is not the case,

then the existing tax structure is not optimal and it can be improved upon,
regardless of what the social weights might be.47
This analysis casts some doubts on an oft given advice that, on the
grounds of equity, some agricultural inputs (like tractors) should be taxed
since they are used primarily by rich farmers, while other inputs (like
fertilizer) should be subsidized since they are used by poor as well as
rich farmers.

The above analysis suggests that such policies, when aimed

at cash crops and production inputs, cannot be justified on the ground of
equity alone;

the primary justificatio n for them should come from the
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importance of cross price effects and from specific kinds of induced
effects of prices on the rural wage.

S.

THE STRUCTURE OF PR! CES IN THE INDUSTRIAL SECTOR

Urban food subsidies are not only widespread in U>Cs, but they are
often also a source of large public deficits.

Attempts to cut food

subsidies have precipi\,ated riots in more than one country.

Modern public

finance theory, as it has been formulated in the context of developed
countries, while providing us with rules which allow the calculation of the
optimal tu-subsidy rates, given precise information concerning all the
elasticities of demand (including cross elasticities) and the social
weights to be associated with each individual, does not give us a clear
qualitative picture.

For instance, as Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) ha~e

pointed out, in the demand systems which are typically estimated in
practice, the commodities with a high income elasticity are often also the
commodities with low price elasticity.

If one ignored distributional

consequences, these are the commodities to tax; but if one focussed on
distributional considerations, then these are the commodities to subsidize.
Thus, whether a particular consumption commodity should be taxed or
subsidized may depend relatively sensitively on the social weights, as well
as on other critical features of the economy, such as what other
instruments for redistribution are available to the government.
There are four features of the economy which we would argue are
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central in analyzing the structure of urban prices and taxes in developing
economies.

These are:

the presence of urban employment, intersectoral

migration, wage-productivity effects, and the urban wage determination
mechanisms.

In the presence of significant uneaployment, the effect of

taxation on the hours of labor that an individual aight hypothetically be
willing to supply - a basic feature of the standard tax analysis in
developed countries - does not seem to us to be of central importance in
the context of the industrial s.ector in LDCs.
Moreover, the migration between the agricultural and the industrial
sector is closely releted to the nature of urban unemployment, as has been
emphasized in the recent development economics literatur,e, and its
implications on tax analysis can be significant.

For instance, if the

agricultural wage is fixed, then an urban food subsidy would make living in
the urban sector more attractive, leading to a higher flow of migration
from the agricultural to the industrial sector.

This in turn might mean

that there would be an increase in the urban unemployment rate, little or
no increase in the welfare of the poor (in terms of their expected
utility), and a possible reduction in the funds available for investment.
It has also been argued sometimes that urban food subsidies may be
desirable in developing economies since they aay improve the health of
workers and, hence, the efficiency of the industrial labor force.

This

argument is, in fact, a part of a class of hypotheses which postulate a
relationship between industrial

wages,

level of unemployment in the economy.

industrial productivity and the
According to these hypotheses, the

output per worker of an industrial firm (net of hiring and training costs)
depends on the wages paid, since wages affect workers' efficiency, quality
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and turnover.

Employers (public or private), therefore, take these effects

into account when setting the wage which, in turn, affects the level of
unemployment.
The reason why we believe that the mechanism of industrial wage
determination is a key issue in the analysis of taxes in I.J)Cs is that if
the government can control industrial wages then, under certain
circumstances (but not always), commodity taxation may be unnecessary in
the industrial sector.

If, on the other hand, wages are determined

endogenously, then one needs to specify the precise mechanism through which
industrial wages are determined (such as, competitive wage setting by
private firms), since a change in the tax policy would result in induced
effects on the industrial wages (similar to those discussed earlier in the
context of agricultural sector) and these effects need to be incorporated
in the design of tax policy.
Elsewhere, we have developed a framework which provides a unified
treatment of unemployment, migration, wage-productivi ty effects and wage
determination; within which one can analyze the consequences of taxation
and pricing, as well as the determination of shadow prices and wages for
cost-benefit analysis.

Moreover, this framework can be specialized to many

different hypotheses concerning, for instance, migration and wage
productivity effects. 48
such an analysis here.

Space limitation does not permit us to describe
We therefore present below a highly simplified

model which emphasizes wage-productivi ty effects, while the consequences of
migration and unemployment are briefly discussed in the next section.
Wage-Productivi ty Effects:

If the wage-productivi ty hypothesis

holds, that is the wage rate affects a worker's productivity, then
efficiency may entail paying high wages in the industrial sector. Also,
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real wages may be relatively insensitive, for instance, to the unemployment
rate.

Wage-productivity effects have been typically studied within models

in which prices are fixed.

A natural ext,nsion, in the present context, is

that the productivity of a worker is a function of his wage as well as the
relative prices he faces.
For simplicity, consider the case of homogenous industrial workers
(its extension to the case of heterogenous workers is discussed later).
The wage-productivity effects are represented as 49

(26)

Y.:: Y(q, w)

The standard assumption in the literature is that higher wages lead to
higher productivity, that is, rJY/rJw

> O.

The effects of prices on

productivity, which have not received attention in the past, are likely to
be ambiguous in general.

However, in the special case in which a worker's

productivity depends only on his utility level, that is

(27)

and rJY/avm

> 0,

it is easy to see that higher prices reduce productivity.SO

Taking (26) into account, and assuming that the urban wages are
fixed and there is no migration, we maximize the aggregate social welfare
with respect to prices.
by the solution to

(28)

The corresponding optimal price structure is given
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h
were rj

=

~
(qj - Pj)/qj is the tax rate on good j, ~ij

represents various compensated elasti~ities, and b. = 1
1

alnxi~ /Blnqj

=BY

rqi·

xiii
1

As is well known, the left hand side of (28) represents the
(tax-induced) proportional reduction in the compensated cons11111ption of good
i,

The standard result that this reduction should be equal for all goods,

however, does not hold here, because of the wage-productivity effects,
which are captured in the last term, bi, of (28).
interpreted by noting ., that b.1

=.-

This term can be

ey•1 Y/q-x~,
where ey 1·
1 1

c

-alnY/Blnq 1.•

bi is therefore a larger negative number for a good if an increase in the
price of this good decreases the productivity to a larger extent (that is
eYi is larger), and if the worker's exp~nditure, qix~, on this good is
smaller.

Obviously, from (28), the proportional reduction corresponding to

such goods should be smaller.
Moreover, a basic prescription of the standard tax theory, that
there should be no commodity taxation if the government can set the wages
also does not hold in the present context.

To see this, we first obtain

the expression for optimal wage, taking prices as fixed.
is characterized by:

1 -

~m

0

The optimal wage

m

-

(q

rw- = bw

P)ax

, where b

w

= BY/aw.

Next, if both the prices and the wage are set optimally, then by
substituting the last expression into (28), we obtain

(2 9)

lj

Now, in the absence of wage-productivity effects, the right band side of
(28) is zero.

Hence r.

J

=

O, and
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(30)

q. = P.
1

1

This,

That is, there should be no commodity taxes in the industrial sector.
however, is not the optimal policy if the wage-productivity effects are
significant.

A special case in which the standard resu_lts are restored, even though
the wage-productivity effects are present, is when a worker's productivity
~epends on the level of his utility.

In this case, b. = 1

Amay;avm,

which is

the same for all goods and therefore, from (28), the proportional reduction
should be equalized across goods.
(because b "" = -b-)
1

,

Also, the right hand side of (29) is zero

which implies that commodity taxation in the urban sector

is unnecessary if the government sets the wages.
In fact, the above results concerning the desirability or undesirability
of urban commodity taxation may hold even if the government does not entirely
control industrial wages.

For instance, consider

a

situation in which wages

are determined through a bargaining between the government and a trade union
which does not suffer from money illusion •. That is, the union knows that an
increase in the price of food represents a worsening of workers' welfare in the
same way that a reduction in their wage does.

Now, if the wage-productivity

effects are of the type represented in (27), then it is better to have no urban
commodity taxation, as in (30), while the wages should be the instrument of
bargaining.

The substitution of a lump

Slll!l

(or wage) tax-subsidy for an equal

utility distortionary tax-subsidy, in this case, generates increased revenues
for the government.

On the other hand, if the wage-productivity effects are

more general, as in (26), then it is desirable to have urban commodity
taxation. 51
The above model is easily generalized to incorporate heterogeneity of
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52
individu als in the industri al sector,

The main implicat ion of this extensio n

is that, in general, various goods will differ not only in their producti vity
effects (bi's), but also in their distribu tional effects.

Goods such as food

may have larger distribu tional effects (since the welfare of the poor is more
sensitiv e to the food prices) as well as larger product ivity effects (due to
the effect of food consump tion on workers' health, for example) and, if this is
the case, then the (tax-indu ced) proporti onal reductio n in food consump tion
should be smaller than,.in other goods.

This extensio n, however, does not alter

our earlier results concerni ng the desirab ility or the undesir ability of urban
commodi ty taxes-su bsidies,

6.

MIGRATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Recent research has drawn attentio n to the importan ce of laoor mobility
across sectors,

In particul ar, it has been pointed out that migratio n from the

agricult ural to the industri al sector might increase industri al unemploy ment
indirect ly, because only some of the migrants can find industri al employm ent.
This possibi lity has importan t conseque nces for tax policy, as the followin g
extensio n of the basic model illustra tes.
Consider three populati on groups:
unemploy ed workers.

peasants , industri al workers and

For brevity, we abstract from the heteroge neity of

individu als within each of these groups, and also assume that there is a single
agricult ural and a single industri al good.

One would expect that, for peasants

who are net sellers of food, a lower rural food price will decrease the
attractiv eness of living in the agricult ural sector, compared to living in the
industri al sector,
lower.

The same effect would arise if the urban food price is

On the other hand,

addition al migratio n to the industri al sector will
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tend to increase the level of unemploy:ment in this sector which, in turn, will
discourage further migration.
We therefore need to calculate the consequences of the induced migration
due to price changes.

First, we need to redefine the elasticity of

agricultural surplus to account for the fact that the rural population itself
is sensitive to prices; this also affects the government revenue from taxation.
Second, an outward migration from the agricultural sector reduces the
population pressure on agricultural land which, in turn, increases the welfare
of those living in this sector.

Third, migration has direct welfare effects as

well, since workers move from one group to another which, in general, have
different levels of utility.
In a general model of migration which we have proposed elsewhere, the
rural population is represented as:
unemployed is given by:

N1 = N1 (p, q, w, N2 ), and the number of

Nu = N - Na - Nm.

If vu denotes the utility of an

unemployed worker, then (7) is replaced by H = NaW(Va) + NmW(Vm) + NuW(\'u) +
61.

The optimal rural food price is characterized by 53

(31)

p + 6
p

~a
1+(1-0

1
=--

TIQp

where iiQp = aln(NaQ)/alnp is the redefined prii:e elasticity of

agricultural surplus (taking into account the effect of price on rural
population), and 6 represents the welfare effects of price-induced
migration. 54

If there is no migration, then TIQp = TIQp• and 9 = 0.

surprisingly, (31) is the same as (12), in this special case.

Not

When there
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is migration, TlQp exceeds 11Qp• and t, is positive, under plausible
circumstances. 55
Now compare the above expression for the optimal price, (31), to the
special case (12) when there is no migration.

The effect of migration then

is to increase the numerator and decrease the denominator in (31), if
investment is more valuable than consumption.

Heuristically, this implies

that migration increases the price which should be paid to peasants for
This makes sense since by paying a higher price to

their surplus.

peasants, the government can reduce the pressure of migration to cities and
hence reduce the resulting urban unemployment which otherwise lowers
society's welfare.

This insight appears to be particularly relevant in the

context of some cities (for example, Bangkok, Cairo and Kexico City) in
which the in-migration from the rural sector has led to serious social
degradation.
Another special case of the above formulation, migration continues
to the point where the expected utility of the marginal migrant (taking
into account the probability of being unemployed) is equal in the two
sectors, 56 and where the marginal productivity of a worker in the rural
sector is fixed.

Then our pricing formula becomes

p

(32)

p

1 +

(1 -

where recall that la is the marginal utility of income to a rural worker.
This expression bas an interesting implication.

In the early stages of

8
development, when the relative social weight on investment, 6/1 , is expected

to be quite large and when the fraction of the population in the
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agricult ural sectcr is expected to be large, the price paid to peasants should
be less than the internat ional price.

But as the economy develops , the price

paid to peasants should increase , and it is quite possible that it should even
57
exceed the internat ional price.

7•

FURTIIER EXTENSIONS

The major componen ts of our models of.develo ping economie s involve
(i) the organiza tion of the agricult ural sector, (ii) the organiza tion of the
industri al sector, (iii) the migratio n and unemploy ment, and (iv) the
internat ional trade environm ent.

In our basic model, the agricult ural sector

consiste d of homogeno us owner-p easants, the industri al sector had homogeno us
workers receivin g a rigid wage, and there was no induced migratio n.

We have

then shown how we can incorpor ate aspects such as the heteroge neity of
individu als within the two sectors, migratio n and unemploy ment, and endogeno us
determin ation of industri al and agricult ural wages.
importan t in many LDCs.

These features are clearly

In this section, we illustra te how the model may be

in
further extended to incorpor ate addition al features which might be importan t
certain economie s.
(a) Sharecro pping in Agricult ure:
importan t.

In some economie s, sharecro pping is

In such cases, all we need to do is to interpre t

<Ji.

as the net

g
surplus of an individu al after paying the landlord 's share, or after receivin
the share from the tenant.

Further, if the share contract is endogeno usly

determin ed, then the individu als' surplus elastici ty will be based in part on
the elastici ties of equilibri um shares with respect to price.

Clearly, the

values of price elastici ties may differ between economie s with sharecro pping
and with peasant holdings , even if the underlyi ng utility function s and
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production functions were identical.
(b)

Composition of Households:

This aspect, though ignored in much of

the standard tax literature, is important since we know that households have
heterogeneous demographic characteristics, particularly when we contrast rural
versus urban households, or rich versus poor households in the agricultural as
well as the industrial sectors.

This affects the social weights, pih, which

depends not only on the income of the households and on the social aversion to
inequality, but also ~n the dem9graphic composition of the households.
Moreover, the households' response to prices would implicitly

depend on their

demographic characteristics.5 8
(c) International Trade Environment:
goods can be exported or imported.

So far we have assumed that all

But some goods have such high

transportation costs that neither alternative is attractive, while in other
cases, even though it may be economically attractive to export a good, the
country may face quantity restrictions and quotas from potential importers.

In

yet other cases, the government may restrict import of certain goods due to
self-sufficiency considerations.

These and other similar situations entail

additional constraints within which pricing policies need to be determined.
Self-sufficiency Objective:

Suppose that the government wishes to

achieve a certain degree of self-sufficiency in food (a self-sufficiency
objective for other goods can be treated similarly).

One way to express this

objective is as a constraint that the quantity of food imported can not exceed
a certain pre-specified fraction of the domestic production.

Obviously, such a

constraint influences pricing decisions only when it is binding.

But once it

is binding, the government's flexibility in setting prices decreases.

For

instance, in the simple model of Section 2, the two prices {p and g) can no
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longe r be varied indep enden tly of one anoth er.
Self-s uffici ency objec tives may also resul t in highe r
food prices for
both the peasa nts and the city-d welle rs, becau se the
govern ment, with
self-s uffici ency in mind, may use price policy to increa
se the surplu s from
peasa nts, and also to curta il urban food consu mptio n.
In this case. then,
peasa nts would be relati vely bette r off, and city-d welle
rs relati vely worse
off. compa red to a situat ion in which there were no self-s
uffici ency
objec tives.
Non-T raded Goods :

Goods such as infras tructu re and inputs into human

capita l forma tion are non-tr aded.

Also, a large numbe r of ordin ary consum ption

and indus trial goods produ ced in LDCs have virtu ally
no intern ation al marke ts,
in part becau se of quali ty consi derati ons, even though
these goods are traded
dome stical ly. For the purpo se of tax policy , these goods
must also be viewed
as non-tr aded goods . If, in additi on, it happe ns that
an LDC faces expor t
const raints on goods which it sells abroad , then the
actua l traded quant ities
would be nearly insen sitive (at the margin ) to the pricin
g polic ies. In
determ ining price s and taxes , theref ore, such an econom
y should be treate d like
a

closed economy.
The differ ence in the treatm ent of· a traded versu s a
non-tr aded good is

simpl e.

The shadow price for a traded good is its intern ation
al price , where as

the shadow price of a non-tr aded good is determ ined,
in our model . endog enous ly
(and simul taneou sly with the determ inatio n of optim al
price s) based on its
socia l margi nal value . 59 Now recal l that we had define
d taxes for traded goods
as the differ ence betwe en the intern ation al price and
the price faced by
consum ers and produ cers.

Taxes for non-tr aded goods can be define d

corres pondi ngly with respe ct to their shadow price s.

This redef initio n,
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however, does not change the expressions for the optimal tax rates which we
have derived earlier.

Our discussion of the qualitative properties of optimal

taxation thus applies to the traded as well as the non-traded goods.
(d) Rigidities in the Economy:

An important rigidity on which we have

focused is the one in the labor market.

The urban wage influences the output

through labor productivity and other effects. and the ai1ration decisions are
based on expected utility which includes

a

probability of remaining unemployed.

The equilibrium market.wage (that is, the wage which private or public
employers would choose to pay) is therefore such that there is unemploymen t.
An important consequence of this approach is that the aarket wage would change

if the tax policy changes, and that the goverDJDent would not. in general, be
60
able to eliminate unemploymen t through taxes and subsidies.
Two other implications of rigidities are as follows.

First, other

rigidities might exist in the economy, such as those in the credit and land
markets, and in the internationa l trade and borrowing environment .

It would

then be necessary to consider all of these rigidities simultaneou sly.

Second,

our analysis has abstracted from the possibility that the adjustments in the
economy, particularly in the labor market, might be lagged.

In such a case,

there are possible intertempora l consequences of taxation policies, and a
myopic taxation policy (based on this period's consequences alone) might differ
from the one in which the dynamics of adjustment is taken into account.
(e) Taxation and Alternative Markets:

A key characteris tic of most tax

instruments is that the tax is actually imposed on the (formal) market
transactions (for example, on a consumer's purchase of a good from a trader, or
an employer's payment of wage to his employee).

What is often ignored in the
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conventional tax analysis is that transactions also take place, to varying
degree, outside the formal market (in which middlemen's services are employed
to

a

substantially lesser extent, but which may not be as economical for large

transactions as the formal market) and that the choice of markets would be
affected by the tax policy.
different individuals.

Moreover, this shift would be different for

This, in turn, has efficiency and equity effects which

have not yet been studied.
This issue is important in LDCs for at least two reasons.

First, a

large proportion of transactions takes place informally because formal markets
are often nonexistent in many areas (due perhaps to the small size of
Second, the widespread prevalence of corruption and tax

transactions).

avoidance can be viewed as an additional division of the formal market into a
regular and an irregular (underground) market.

The latter market, while

economizing on transactions and entailing middlemen's costs, avoids taxation,
often with the connivance of the tax bureaucracy.

Presumably, however, it has

some disadvantages over the formal regular market, otherwise everyone would
switch to the irregular market and no tax revenue would be collected.

A full

analysis of taxation in LDCs needs to take into account the shifts among these
various markets.

8.

TAX ANALYSIS FOR DEVELOPING VERSUS DEVELOPED ECONOMIES

Often there is a temptation among policy analysts to borrow results from
the standard tax literature and prescribe them in LDC situations without
examining the premises on which these results are based.

Such an approach

overlooks what we consider to be two fundamental differences bet~een LDCs and
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developed economies: concerning the tax instruments which the government can or
cannot use, and concerning the salient features of the economy.
The constraints on the government's ability to employ particular
instruments of taxation are, in turn, related to the information available and
to the administrative costs associated with different tax instruments. 61

In

I.DC agriculture, for example, it is virtually impossible to tax labor
transactions.

This inability to tax can be viewed as an information problem:

though the concept of labor transaction is a perfectiy well defined economic
concept, a tax system must be based only on those variables which are
quantitatively ascertainable (at a reasonable cost) by an outside ·party.

We

therefore believe that our assumption that the labor transactions cannot be
taxed in an LDC agriculture with heterogenous individual& is more realistic
than the one made in the standard tax model [Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), for
example) that the government can tax all trades that an individual
undertakes. 62 , 63
Moreover, in many versions of the standard tax model, all profits are
taxed away.

Its counterpart in the agricultural sector requires the government

to impose a 100 percent tax on land rent.

For obvious reasons (such as the

government's inability to distinguish bet~een the returns from land and those
from other inputs), sucl, a tax is almost certainly infeasible.

The issue of

land taxation, in fact, provides a good example of the constraints on tax

instruments.

This tax has been highly recommended by conventional economic

theory since David Ricardo, 64 but it faces the following problem.

If the land

tax is based on land area, irrespective of the quality, then it is viewed as
unfair.

On the other hand, basing a land tax on land quality is inherently

difficult:

a direct measurement of land quality requires, once again,

disentangling the effect of land quality from that of other inputs, whereas the
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absence of good land markets makes it difficult to obtain an indirect measure
of land quality. 65
These differences have important consequences on tax policy.

For

instance, oft quoted results [Diamond and Mirrlees (1971)] that the producer
prices should be same as the shadow prices and that there should be no tax on
international trade need to be interpreted with considerable caution.

The

former result not only requires the government to be able to impose taxes on
all trades, as well as 100 percent tax on profits, but it is also based on the
standard definition of firms which purchase all of their inputs and sell all of
their output.

Firms, by definition do not consume.

Under this definition, the

farms of our model are not firms, since farmers are both producers as well as
consumers (at least for certain goods like foodgrains). 66

Moreover, within an

lDC agricultural sector, it is virtually impossible to implement different
producers' and consumers' prices, since the transactions (of food, for example)
within a household and across households can not be easily monitored.

9.

POLI TI CAL ECONOMY OF PR! CING AND TAXATION :
SOME MISGIVINGS ON THE STANDARD TAX TIIEORY

Often the most important rationale for taxation and pricing policies in
lDCs is that they redistribute from the rich to the poor.
actual policies often seem to do just the opposite.

On the other hand,

This apparent

contradiction raises some issues which need to be studied.
Assume, for a moment, that redistribution (from the rich to the poor) is
indeed a key government objective.

A basic question we then need to ask is:

How much redistribution is possible, given the set of feasible taxation and
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pricing instrumen ts?

Note that this is a positive question (in contrast to

the normative question: how much redistribu tion is desirable ), and that it can
be examined quantitati vely by devising appropria te measures of the
redistribu tion achieved.

Suppose it turns out that very little improveme nt in

the welfare of the poor can be achieved, say, through taxation and pricing of
goods (which happen to be the only instrumen ts the governmen t can employ). then
the discourse on tax policy is modified in at least two ways.

First. the

redistribu tive objective of gov~rnmen t loses much of its practical relevance
.~
.
since. given the set of available instrumen ts, very little redistribu tion can
be achieved regardless of what the governmen t desires.

By the same token. it

becomes clear that if the governmen t indeed wants redistribu tion, then it must
work towards enlarging the set of instrumen ts.
Sah (1983a) has examined the maximum extent to which the welfare of the
poorest can be improved (when the only instrumen ts available to the governmen t
are taxation and pricing of goods), and has shown that the achievable
redistribu tion can indeed be quite small,
this result.

There are at least three reasons for

First, if there are significan t substituti on possibili ties, then

there is a limit to how much revenue can be collected by taxing luxuries;
this, in turn, restricts the extent to which necessitie s can be subsidized .
Second, the (marginal) deadweigh t losses associated with commodity taxation are
often large and, therefore, even if a (marginal) change in taxes imposes a
large burden on the rich, it may not be of. any help to the poor.

Third, if

the poor consume even small amounts of luxuries and if the rich consume some
amounts of necessitie s, then an excessive ly high tax on luxuries can be quite
damaging to the poor, and large subsidies on necessitie s would, to some extent,
benefit the rich.

This analysis clearly suggests that there might be hitherto
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unrecognized limitations on the redistributive capabilities of commodity
taxation and pricing. 6 7
Now, assume that redistribution from rich to the poor is not the
objective of taxation. Instead, taxation is used by the more powerful groups in
the society for their own advantage.

It is obvious that the analytical

apparatus developed in this chapter can be applied with these objectives as
well.

For example, if the city dwellers control the political system and they

maximize their own welfare, then the prices they will set will correspond to
the rules we developed earlier, where the social weights on the income of
peasants is set at zero.
Empirical studies have not so far provided much guidance on which oDe of
these two polar assumptions concerning the government's objective is more
realistic or what particular combination of these two cases is most plausible.
Casual observation suggests that the latter objective (iD which tax policies
are employed by some groups against others) might be playing an important role.
Some of the most important historical conflicts have been associated with one
group of individuals attempting to use discriminatory policies against other
groups.

Among the landmarks are:

the conflicts associated with corn laws in

England, the discord between the North and the South in the United States
leading to the civil war, and the conflicts between the advocates of peasants
versus those of industrial workers in the pre-collectiviz ation USSR.
It is quite plausible, then, that the domination of one group by another
is an important factor determining pricing policies in present-day LDCs.
Whether an analysis such as the present one would serve to improve the equity
and efficiency in an economy, or whether it will be used by some groups to
discriminate against others, is a question of concern to us.
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10.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

LDCs display an enormous variety of institutional arrangements. and
these arrangements have a critical influence in determining the impact of
taxation and pricing policies and, hence. on the design of these policies.
Clearly. then, there is no single model, no single prescription, which is
applicable to all countries.

We have therefore constructed a general framework

which can be adapted t~ the special circumstances facing individual countries.
For the agricultural sector. for example. Ye have considered family farms
(which can hire in or out labor}. landless workers and sharecropping.
Plantations are important in some countries. and our framework can be easily
adapted to take that into account.

Our framework also incorporates the effects

that pricing and taxation have on the distribution of agricultural earnings and
on land.congestion, and the consequences that these effects have. in turn, on
the welfare of those in the agricultural sector,
At the same time, we have shown that one cannot simply transfer the
policy conclusions reached for developed economies -- no matter how
sophisticated the reasoning -- to LDCs.

Developing economies face fundamental

restrictions on their ability to levy certain taxes (which in part are due to
the administrative costs and informational constraints, which can be severe in
many LDCs). and also the salient features of these economies are different.
Our framework is sensitive to the restrictions on the feasibility of various
tax instruments, and we show how these restrictions lead many of our results to

be different from those in the standard tax literature.
Concerning the salient features of the LDCs, we have emphasized the
dependence of taxation and pricing policies on the nature of wage-productivity
effects, on the nature of migration and unemployment, and on the nature of
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wages (and earnings) deterninatio n mechanisms in the agricultural and the
industrial sectors.

The government may not always be able to eliminate

industrial unemploymen t, even if it wishes to do so, due to the endogeneity of
industrial wages.

Moreover, it may not even wish to do so if it considers the

correspondin g costs (due to the wage-produc tivity effects, for example} to be
too high.

A change in taxes and prices, would then affect unemployment which,

in turn, has output effects as well as welfare effects.

This concern of ours

with unemploymen t is markedly different from the central concern of standard
tax theory ,,..hich assumes full employment, and focuses on the deleterious
effects of reductions in labor supply.
Finally, in most LDCs there is only limited information on the
parameters of the economy (such as various elasticities and social weights).
We have therefore derived rules for price reform which can be applied based on
qualitative (and local) information.

Moreover, agreements on the relative

magnitudes of social weights correspondin g to different groups of individuals
are often difficult to achieve; we have therefore proposed rules which lead
to Pareto improvement s; reforms that increase not only the welfare of each
individual in the economy, but also public investment.
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FOOTNOTES

1.

For some empirical details on the interventions in LDCs agriculture, see
Bale and Lutz (1979).

2.

There is a long tradition, cutting across ideological boundaries, which
views the agricultural sector as the desirable source of public revenue.
In the Marxist tradition, this approach was advocated by many leaders of
the October Revolution in what came to be known as the 'Soviet
Industrialization Debate' and the 'Scissors Problem'.

Our 1984a and

1985a papers analyze this problem, both in the context of the Soviet
debate as well as in the context of present day LDCs.

In the classical

laissez faire tradition, on the other hand, the agricultural sector has
been viewed as an ideal source of public revenue, at least since David
Ricardo claimed that the land tax is the best form of taxation.

We

later discuss the issue of land taxes.

3.

Economists are typically reluctant to deal with so-called 'non-economic'
objectives such a~ self-sufficiency.

The fact of the matter is that in

many countries (for example, India and South Korea), self-sufficiency is
an unambiguously stated national policy.

We show how these objectives

may be incorporated into a policy analysis, while pointing out the

associated economic costs.
4.

Among other objectives are to stabilize prices faced by consumers and
producers [see Newbery and Stiglitz (1981)], to redistribute income away
from middlemen towards consumers and producers,or from one region to
another.
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5.

Not only are farm price

These remarks apply outside of U>Cs as well.

interventi ons ,ddespread ii:; industria l economies, but so is the
confusion associated with it.

Some of the most bitter controver sies

among the EEC members have arisen in the past, for example, due to their
disagreem ents on farm price policies.
6.

In economies where different commoditi es are produced or consumed in
different regions, or by different ethnic groups, different agricultu ral
policies have different effects on the welfare of these different
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regions and groups.
7.

These issues have not received much attention in the literature .
however, Dixit (1969, 1971), and Dixit and Stern (1974).

See,

Also, some

researche rs have analyzed agricultu ral pricing using approache s based on
consumer and producer surplus; for example, Tolley, Thomas and Wong
(1982). Sah (1982b) poii:;ts out the limitation s of such approache s, and
provides an empirical framework to implement an approach such as the one
developed in this chapter.
8.

See Sah (1978, 1982b, 1983a), Stiglitz (1982b) and Sah and Stiglitz
( 1984a, 1984b, 1985a, 1985b).

9.

Harberger (1971) and Stiglitz (1974a) have pointed out the dramatic
implicatio ns that migration may have on shadow prices in social
cost-bene fit analysis; the implicatio ns for pricing and taxation would
appear to be potential ly no less significan t.

10.

In simple models, it can be shown that the complemen ts of leisure should
be taxed, and the substitute s subsidize d.

See Corlett and Hague (1953).

For an extension of this interpreta tion to many commoditi es, see
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972).

so
11.

In our 1985b paper, for instance, we have followed this approach in
analyzing shadow wages.

Our formulae not only provide ne~ insights, but

they also yield most of the existing results on shadow wages as special
cases.
12.

For instance, under certain circumstances, sharecropping can be
explained as a risk-sharing incentive scheme (Stiglitz, 1974b).

In this

case, changes in taxation and pricing policies may result in the long
run in changes _}n the terms of the sharecropping.

Unfortunately, space

limitation does not allow us to pursue here some of these issues as much
as we would like.
13.

See Stiglitz (1974a, 1976a, 1982a, 1982c, 1982d), and Mirrlees (1975b),
among others, on wage-productivity effects in U)Cs.

For a discussion of

these effects in the context of developed countries, see Akerlof (1984),
Calvo (1979), Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), Stiglitz (1976b, 1985a), and
Yellen (1984).
14.

The two classic papers are by Ramsey (1927) who posed the problem as one
of taxation, and Boiteaux (1956) who posed it as one of pricing.

For a

survey of what has grown to be a vast literature, see Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1980).
15.

The fact that limitations on the instruments available to the government
may have significant effects on tax policy has long been recognized.
For instance, Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) showed that the
Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) result on the desirability of productive
efficiency and its corrollary, the undesirability of taxes on
intermediate goods and imports and exports, depended critically on the
assumption that the government could impose 100 percent taxes on profits
and could levy taxes on all commodities and labor; assumptions which
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are even less persuasive in the context of LDCs than in the context of
developed countries.

Similarly, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) show that

the the structure of optimal commodity taxes depends critically on
whether income tax is feasible or not.
16.

The problem may be almost as severe in developed countries.

Calculation

of optimal tax rates requires knowledge of all cross elasticities, both
in consumption and production.

It appears virtually impossible to

obtain reliable estimates of these; most estimating procedures impose
considerable structure on the demand and supply systems, which
implicitly constrain the values of some of the cross elasticities.
17.

Though it is important to note here that different social welfare
functions, while giving rise to different sets of optimal taxes, may not
always lead to significant differences in the total amount of taxes
which an individual pays, or in the resulting levels of welfare of
different individuals.

For example, a simulation of optimal commodity

taxes for India, based on heterogeneous individuals in the two sectors,
showed that the amounts of taxes paid by different individuals were
quite insensitive to the society's inequality aversion [see Sah (1978)).
This result is consistent with the argument we present later that
commodity pricing and taxation may be rather inadequate instruments for
a significant redistribution from the rich to the poor.

18.

Elsewhere, such an approach has been called the New New Welfare
Economics [Stiglitz (1985b)].

19.

In particular, we do not examine all of the potentially important
features of the economy, and it is conceivable that some features to
which we have given insufficient attention may turn up to be of
importance in subsequent research.

However, it should be noted that we
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have analyzed a much wider variety of considerations than those reported
here.

For instance, we do not discuss here the consequences of capital

allocation and mobility between the two sectors, and of private savings
which, in the long run, may indeed be important.

These aspects can be

easily incorporated within our general framework. See the earlier
(1984b) version of this paper for a discussion of
20.

so■ e

of these aspects.

In our 1985b paper, we have developed a similarly general aodel for the
determination of,,._wages and earnings in the industrial sector.

Due to

space constraints, we present later only some special cases of this
model.

21.

Nor do we assume any functional forms to represent individuals'
responses.

It should be obvious, however, that simulation exercises at

this level of generality can become quite difficult and, not
surprisingly, strong special assumptions are typically employed in such
exercises.

For instance. the simulation analysis in the Beady-Mitra

chapter in this volume is based on the special case in which individuals
within each sector are homogeneous, demand functions are based on the
linear expenditure system (LES), and the production technology has
constant elasticity of substitution.

The results of such simulations

must be interpreted with care because, as is well known, the
parameterization one employs in simulation may seriously bias the
optimal tax rates one obtains.

For a dramatic example of the

consequences of the LES assumption on optimal commodity taxes, see
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).

22.

We are at present abstracting from migration and capital flows.

With

migration, the utility of a peasant is also a function of the number of
persons in the agricultural sector.

If there are capital flows, then
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the utility is also a function of the interest rates at which peasants
can borrow and lend.
23.

In any event, our present analysis does not deal with a collectivist
agriculture or with an agriculture based on government managed
parastatals.

24.

It should be obvious that non-linear tax-subsidy-pricing schemes, if
administratively feasible and not too expensive, are better (in a Pareto
sense) than the standard (linear) pricing.

This is simply because a

non-linear scheme provides 'more' instruments to the government than the
standard pricing, and the government cannot do worse by having more
instruments.

Also, restricted non-linear schemes, such as those

entailed by quotas and rations, are desirable additions to standard
pricing because, once again, one cannot do worse by having more
instruments.

But schemes such as quotas and rations are not necessarily

desirable alternatives to standard pricing.

See Sah (1982a) for an

analysis of these schemes.
25.

Yet the assumption is not completely satisfactory.

Though the

government can, for instance, tax profits, it can seldom impose a 100
percent profits tax.

There are numerous discussions of the problems

that lDCs have in controlling multi-nationals.

In fact, questions may

even be raised whether the government controls nationalized industries.
Our assumption that the government can control the industrial sector is
partly to simplify the analysis, partly to dramatize the difference
between the urban and rural sectors.

As we discuss later, the analysis

can be modified for those cases in which the government's control on the
industrial sector is li~ited and indirect.

26.

If ~xq

<

1, then a decrease in the urban food prices decreases
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investment and, hence, a Pareto improving reform in the urban price is
not possible within the simple model presented here.
27.

This independence is partly because the economy is open to external
trade.

In a closed economy, a Pareto improving price reform typically

involves simultaneous changes in both the rural as well as the urban
price, since corresponding to a p there is a value of q which clears the
market for the agricultural good.
28.

See Sah and Stiglitz (1985b).

In an agricultural sector in which individuals buy and sell labor
services, an additional requirement for the above rule of price refor~
to hold is that the rural wage should not be significantly sensitive to
the rural food price.

A disaggregated analysis of the agricultural

sector with beterogencius individuals is presented later in this chapter.
29.

Wis increasing and concave in V.

Bis the Hamiltonian representing the

current value of the time discounted social welfare.
presented in this chapter hold at every point in time.

The results
(The same

formulation can be further employed to trace the path of optimal prices
and other variables over time; this however is beyond the scope of the
present chapter.)

Further, the simplest assumption to make concerning

how.the investment is used is that it is employed to increase the
capital stock in the industrial sector.

For a more detailed discussion

of the alternative uses of investment, see the earlier version (1984b)
of this chapter.
30.

To obtain these expressions we have used the Roy's formula:
AaQ, and avm/aq = _Amxm.

ava/ap =

Also, we assume that µa and µmare positive.

From (10), µa is positive if ~Qp) ~a/6 ~ 1.

We expect this condition

to be met in LDCs at early stages of development, since the social
weight on investment is likely
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From (11), µm) 0 if~

to be higher thac that on the rural income.
1 - ~m/&.

x~

)

This condition may not always be met, especially if the urban

demand elasticity of food (with respect to price) is very saall and if
the government does not care about the industrial workers.
then the urban price should be increased.

If p•

< O,

Note, however, that the

present model abstracts from effects such as that of con11111ption and
wages on workers' productivity, which we discuss later.

Increasing the

urban price beyond some level would not be desirable when these effects

•

are taken into account, even if the government does not care about the
welfare of industrial workers.
31.

The obser~ed pattern in many LDCs in which the urban food price is often
lower than the international price, thus, seems inconsistent with
equalitarian social welfare.

Note, however, that our results need to be

qualified by concerns such as intra-sectoral inequality, which we do
below.

32.

Since the choice of peasants' labor hours is endogenous, and the value
of their output is influenced by a change in

p,

these elasticities, ~Ip

and~ xp , are not the standard partial elasticities in which income is
held constant.

33.

In Pigou's formula, the magnitude of the tax rate is proportional to
1/~Xp + 1/~xp·

34.

See, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 467).

This should not be surprising.

In the formulations of standard aeneral

equilibrium models, what matters is the net trade; for farmers, this is
just their marketed surplus.

35.

The sum .of weights in the numerator adds up to the denominator since,
from the rural labor market clearing condition,
Lh = 0 in the special case in which everyone is

l
h

Lh = O.

Obviously,
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identical.

36.

Also, (7) is now modified to be:

The social weights proposed in the earlier literature have often
abstracted from these general equilibrium effects. as in Feldstein
(1972), Diamond (1975) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976).

The difference

arises because these papers assume that the government can impose wage
taxes, so the wages received by individuals need not depend on commodity
taxes.
37.

The wage elasticity term does not appear in (17), while it does in (16).
This is simply because at present we are assuming that industrial wages
are fixed.

In more general models, such as those discussed later in

Section 5, wage elasticity terms would appear in the expressions
· analogous to (17).

Also, though we are considering here a single type

of labor, its generalization to a multitude of skill types is
straightforward.
38.

We have attempted to compare the resulting optimal prices with those
which would be optimal when the intrasectoral heterogeneity is
suppressed [that is, when the social weight in the rural (urban) sector
is calculated for a 'representative' peasant (industrial worker) who bas
average land area (income)].

The comparison depends, in a complicatd

way, on the precise functional forms of the ~ocial welfare function and
the utility functions, and it does not yield any general conclusion.

39.

The same good sometimes belongs to more than one category; for
example, tractors are primarily employed in agricultural production but
are occasionally used for personal transportation.

40.

In practice, there are some ambiguities in the precise geographical
definition of such a border, since agricultural activities are someti~es
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undertaken on the fringe areas of cities which fall under cities' tax
jurisdiction.

Also, our assumption that trades within the agricultural

sector cannot be taxed somewhat overstates the constraints on the
government.

What is crucial for our purpose is whether a transaction

can be monitored, so that a tax can be imposed.

If a farmer can sell

directly to another farmer, then it is unlikely that a tax can be
collected.

The LDC governments can (and frequently do) attempt to

impose taxes and marketing controls on transactions within the
agricultural sector.

9ne of the implications of such interventions is

to encourage individuals to avoid making use of formal markets, so that
the taxes can be avoided.
41.

This implication is discussed later.

Further, in (3), Y now denotes the value of the entire vector of
industrial outputs, measured at the international prices.

The numeraire

good is any one of the pure consumption goods produced in the industrial
sector, of which the quantity consumed by a peasant is yah.

Both xmh

and q are also vectors.
42.

This equality yields a multiperson Ramsey-like rule, with a difference
that induced general equilibrium effects on wages and earnings are now
taken into account.

This rule has the standard interpretation of how

the proportional reduction in the consumption of a good should be
related to its distributional characteristics [see Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1980,p. 386-390)].

43.

This assumption, hov.·ever, is not required in the rest of this chapter ..
We should point out here that the same assumption is made in most of the
empirical work on farmers' responses (on which an implementation of
price policy must ultimately be based).

Moreover, the same assumption
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underlies typical simulation exercises on tax policy (see, for example,
the chapter by Beady and Mitra in this volume).
44.

For dimensional consistency, the vector z contains zeros for those goods
which are not produced but are consumed by the households.

Similarly,

the vector xab contains zeros for those goods which are produced but are
no consumed by the households.

This convention is adopted solely for

expositional simplicity; it has no economic significance.
45.

..

This happens if the .profit function (on unit land) is separable between
Denote the unit profit

prices of the production goods and other prices.

p

2

is the vector of production goods' prices and Ld is the labor

applied on unit land.

Then, for the production good i,

a 2G
aG 1aG2

1

aG

awa /

Therefore, the elasticity alnzi/alnv;a = g 1wa is the same for all i.

For

details on the underlying production technologies, see Lau (1978).
46.

The labor market clearing condition is ~
differentiation, gives dwa/dpi = - (~

Lh(p, wa) = O, which, upon

aLh/api)/~

aLh/awa.

Next,

Lb= L! - AhLd where L! is the labor supply of the household h.
Since the prices of production good affect the labor supply only through
full income, ath/api =AhziaL!/aMh-AhaLd/a pi.
footnote 45 that -aLd/api = glzi.
where g = -

Now, recall from

It follows that:

~ Ah (gl + aL!taMh) /

l aLh/awa.

h

h

dwa/dpi = gzi,

Using these, the

earlier reform analysis can be reproduced, with a difference that
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no11

B = (P - p)

{

2

A speci al case of

h

For

ts.
this is, of cours e, when there are no induce d wage effec
this, simply subst itute g = 0.
47.

of credi t
Obvio usly, one needs to take accou nt of the functi oning
marke ts.

48.

aches to
In Sah and Stigl itz (1985 b), we develo p gener al appro
earnin gs.
migra tion as well as to 'the determ inatio n of indus trial
in wh.ich wages
These can be speci alized , for examp le, to situat ions
nt the induce d
are set (by priva te or publi c firms} taking into accou
turno ver.
effec ts on labor effici ency, labor qualit y and labor
l region s
Also, the model can be extend ed to multi ple agric ultura
es, and to
provid ing differ ent types of en1ployment oppor tuniti
in the forma l
hetero genou s urban popul ation (for examp le, worke rs
ctor).
subse ctor versu s ,rnrke rs in the 'grey ' inform al subse

49.

that the
This repre senta tion is consi stent with a hypot hesis
y.
produ ctivit y depen ds on the level of worke r's utilit

It is also

be more
consi stent with a hypot hesis that the produ ctivit y may
, such as health
close ly relate d to the consu mptio n of certa in goods
.
care and food, than to the consum ption of other goods

SO.

y depen ds on the
For instan ce, consid er the case in which produ ctivit
w)).
quant ities of consum ption goods , that is Y = Y(xm( q,

The

ined, in
effec t of a price change on produ ctivit y is then determ
by price s.
part, by how the consum ption quant ities are affect ed
consum ption of
Now, an increa se in the price of a good increa ses the
consum ption of
some goods (gross subst itutes ) while it decre ases the
others (gross compl ement s).

Clear ly, theref ore, the
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sign of aY/oqi cannot be predicted in general.

51.

In the special case,

An alternative institutional setting is the one in which private

firms set wages to maximize their profits, taking into account
wage-productivi ty effects.

The resulting wage, in general, would be

different than the one which the government would set (to maximize
H) and thus, in certain cases, commodity taxes may be used for a
partial 'correction' of private decisions.

52.

This extension is similar to the one in Section 4.

Expression (27)

now be comes :

-l

(qj

=

j

~

L (1 -

13mh

~ -

axmh

(q -

P)

n

J

mh
x1•

2

+ N

h

aY

04i

Productivity is now represented, in general, as:
Y = Y(q, w1 , ... , wh, •.. ).
w 1) ,

53.

••• ,

,.,mh
( q,
t'

.h) ,

~

A special case of this is:

Y = yn,,ml(q,

... ) .

Here, we are ignoring the consumption of unemployed workers, and
assuming that the industrial wage is fixed in terms of industrial goods.
Also, the level of industrial employment is fixed, since it is derived
from an equalization of the industrial wage and the marginal product of
labor.

These assumptions are being made solely for brevity, as should

be obvious from the footnote 48.

54.

~ = [W(Va) - W(Vu) - J3ap:XAA]mp/6Q ~Qp•

ax

where A is the agricultural

land per peasant, XA = aA is the marginal output (per peasant)
olnNa
of land, and m =
is the elasticity of rural
p
olnp
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population with respect to the rural price.
that is, the

We assume

vm > va > ,,,..u,

industrial workers are better-off than peasants, who in

turn are better-off than those who are unemployed.

We also assume

agricultural land is not too scarce, that is JJ.A is small, and that ~QA
a1nQ

= alnA (which is the elasticity of agricultural surplus

per peasant with respect to the land per peasant) is smaller than one.
Now, note in the expression for~ that the square bracket represents
the net welfare gain if one unemployed worker migrates to the

•
agricultural sector.

Specifically, W(Va) - W(Vu) is the direct welfare

gain, and ~apXAA is the welfare loss due to the congestion effect of
migration on others in the agricultural sector.

This net gain is

positive, from the above assumptions.

SS.

This follows from the previous footnote, and from ijQp = ~Qp + (1 ~QA)mp.

Vi'e assume that the agricultural population increases if the

price of agricultural surplus is higher, that is mp) O.

This

assumption is automatically satisfied under the Harris-Todaro migration
hypothesis which we discuss below.
56.

This is the well known Harris-Todaro migration hypothesis.

For

simplicity, we assume here that the social welfare function is
utilitarian, that is, pa= Aa.

The main implication of the

Harris-Todaro hypothesis then is that:

H = NVa + 61, instead of (7).

The corresponding results thus bold, regardless of the migration
mechanism, in all those circumstances in which the government is
concerned with the rural welfare alone.

Other migration hypotheses can

be similarly obtained as special cases of our formulation.

For

instance, if it is posited that there is free migration and no
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unemployment, but the utility of a worker in one sector is a fraction of
the utility in another sector <-see the chapter by Beady and llitra in
this volU11e), then this is a special case of our foraulation in which Nu
is set at zero, and the expression
defined by

v1 (p,

special case is:

!it'• !it'(p,

q, w,

il>

is laplicitly

N1 ) • er(p,w, N2 ),where e is a paraaeter.

A further

es 1, which iaplies the standard aeoolassioal

assumption that free migration equalizes workers' utilities across
sectors.
57.

Pricing in the industrial sector in the presence of endogenous migration
can be analyzed similarly.

Also, note that the rules of price reform

derived earlier in Section 3 apply with
present case as well.
food price,

<•>.

so■e

aodifications in the

For example, the rule for reform in the rural

applies in the present case if

'lop is replaced by

'lQp.

58.

See Sah (1983b) for a aethodoloay for analyzing intra-household
allocations.

59.

Specifically, those elements of the vector P wh.ich correspond to
non-traded goods are replaced by the vector (/6, where elements of the
vector~ are the Lagrange aultipliers to the aarket clearina conditions
of various non-traded aoods.

60.

This point has been missed in some of the earlier literature which has
presumed that there always exist aovernaent policies which can eliainate
uneaployaent.

This supposition, in turn, haa

so■ etiaes

led to

a

belief

that since the 1over1L111ent can eliminate unemployaent, it would do so.
Consequently, unemployment must necessarily be a short run phenomenon
which can be ianored in a long run policy analyais.

These views are

clearly misleading if the endogeneity of wages is taken into account.
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61.

See Stiglitz (forthcoming), for a discussion of such constraints.

62.

This difference, however, is not important in our simpler model (Section
2 and 3) in which there are homogenous peasants, since there are no
labor transactions in this case.

63.

There are other restrictions on the set of taxes, which the standard
models impose as we do; in particular, that there is no income tax.
This assumption makes no sense for a developed economy, but is relevant
for many LDCs.

See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980) for a discussion of the

effects of income taxation on the optimal structure of commodity taxes.
64.

For a recent analysis of some of the classical views on land taxation,
see Feldstein (1977).

65.

It is perhaps not surprising that negligible use is made of the land tax
in most LDCs, and that its use has steadily declined over time.

This is

possibly because the use of coercion required to administer such a tax
is less feasible today than it was earlier •
.6 6.

Also, by this definition, those establishments are not firms where an
owner-manager's effort has an effect on the outcomes, and bis effort
cannot be monitored.

Such establishments are in this formal sense just

like the farms in our model [See Stiglitz (1974b)], in which a direct
tax on labor (effort) can not be imposed.

It is impossible to separate

out that fraction of an owner-manager's income which is due to his
efforts from the fraction which represents pure profits.

Thus, the

production efficency result may be almost as inapplicable to developed
economies as it is to LDCs.
67.

The extent to 11·hich differential commodity taxation can achieve
redistribution also depends on how finely one can differentiate among
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commodities.

Differences in the consumption of particular types of

grains across income groups may be larger than the differences in the
total consumption of grains; but informational requirements and
enforcement costs are likely to increase rather rapidly with the degree
of differentiation •

...
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